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F. Nos. 18625, 18626.

In Bank.

.June 29,

PARR-HICHMOND INDUSTRIAL CORPORA'riON (a Corporation), Respondent, v. S. S. BOYD, as County 'l'ax
Collector, etc., et al., Appellants.
Taxation-Equalization-Proceedings-Review- Presentation
Below.~Owner of property
may not attack detennination of board of equalization in court unless he has
and
question of value of his property to such
[ 2] I d.-Equalization-Proceedings-Review-Presentation Below.
-'Where taxpayer attacks assessment as void because he does
not own property on which tax demand was made, there is no
question of valuation which must be presented to board of
equalization as prerequisite to judicial relief.
[3] !d.-Equalization-Proceedings-Review-Presentation Below.
~·Where taxpayer seeks relief on theory that tax was illegal
because levied against the whole ownership interest, instead
of against limited possessory interest for which he admits
liability, prior application to board of equalization is not prerequisite to recourse to court.
[4] Conversion and Reconversion- Equitable Conversion.-Doctrine of <>quita ble conversion is mere fiction resting on principle that equity reg·ards things whch are directed to be done
as having actually been performed whf,re nothing has intervened which ought to prevent such a performance.
[5] !d.-Contract for Sale of Land.-An unconditional contract
for sale of land, of which specific performance would be decreed, grants purehaser equitable title, and equity considers
him the owner.
[6] Id.-Intent as Determining Factor.-There is no equitable conversion where the contracting parties, sueh as vendor and purchaser of land, demonstrate a contrary intention.
[7] Taxation-Subjects of Taxation-Real Property-Ownership
or Possessory Interests.-Where purchase of land from government wa~ mad(' conditional on conveyance of merchantable
See Cal.Jur., Taxation, §§ 230, 283; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 767
et seq.
Doctrine of equitable eonversion in relation to taxation,
note, 112 A.L.R. 23. See, also, Am.Jur., Equitable Conversion, § 2.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Taxation,§ 208; [4, 6] Conversion
and I-teconversion, § 1; [5, 9, 10) Conversion and Reconversion,
§ 2; [7] Taxation, §53; [8] Vendor and Purchaser, § 206; [11]
Taxation, § 289; [12] Taxation, § 288.
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itself
which uncertain event the down
was held in escrow, and where government consented to purchaser's use of property and
to convey title as of September
1947, but subsequently deeds were delivered which
recited that they became effective June 1, 1949, such reeital
earlier writing that title would be
and tax
on purtax year 1948-1949 instead of on
his possessory interest
sueh period was illegal.
Vendor and Purchaser-Liability for Taxes.-As between vendor and vendee, real estate is ordinarily taxable to vendor
where sale is conditional.
[9] Conversion and Reconversion-Contract for Sale of Land.For doctrine of
eonversion to apply in measure of
tax liability, there must be a contract for sale and purchase
of land whieh is specifically enforceable at time rights of
the
are
and if vendor did not havr~ at that time
the title which be contracted to eonvey there was no eonv<~rsion.
[10] !d.-Contract for Purchase of Land.-Where contract binds
corporation to purchase property if government within reasonable time conveys merchantable title, and where government
at time of contract's exeeution did not have such title and
therefore no right to specific performance, there was no equitable conversion to support tax assessments against corporation.
[11] Taxation-Recovery of Taxes Paid-Amount Recoverable.\Vhere plaintiff's possessory interest in land was taxable;
but the tax was improperly assessed upon the whole beneficial
interest, a recovery of tax paid should be limited to difference
between amount paid and that which properly should have been
paid.
[12] Id.- Recovery of Taxes Paid- Review.-Where defendant
tax officials made no objection in trial court to mathematical
aecuraey of computation of plaintiff's possessory interest in
property involved if plaintiff had only such interest, and where
trial court had authority to enter judgment aecordingly, defendants are in no position on appeal to challen!<P correctness
of trial eourt's finding of what was actually due from plaintiff
hased on approved valuation formula for possessory interests.

APPEAI_JS from judg-ments of the Superior Court of Contra
Costa County. Thomas F. Keating, Judge.* Affirmed.
Actions to recover taxes paid under protest.
for plaintiff affirmed.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Couneil.

Judgments
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Francis
District
(Contra Costa) ,
Charles L.
Deputy District Attorney, 'fhomas M.
Carlson, City Attorney (Richmond), and Frederick Bold, Jr.,
Special Assistant to City Attorney, for Appellants.
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon and John F. Ward for ReSPENCB, J .-Plaintiff brought two actions to recover
taxes paid under protest on certain property in Richmond
for the tax years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950.
& Tax.
§§ 5136-5143.) 'l'he cases were consolidated for trial,
and it 1vas stipulated that evidence \vould be produced only
in the first ca3e and that the judgment therein would govern
the second case. The tax assessments by the county of Contra
Costa and the city of Richmond followed the same pattern,
the levy in each instance resting on the premise that title
to the real property was vested in plaintiff m1 the first Monday
in March of both years. Plaintiff, on the other hand, has
consistently claimed that all it had on the respective tax dates
was, as the trial court found, ''a qualified and contingent
possessory interest in the form of a gratuitous and revocable
right to possession''; that the assessment should have been
made only against such possessory right, and not as if it held
the whole beneficial interest. In line with plaintiff's admitted
tax liability on its possessory interest in the property, respective judgments were entered against the county and the
city reflecting the offset between the taxes paid by plaintiff
under protest and the amounts assessable because of plaintiff's
limited possessory right. From such judgments defendants
appeal.
As grounds for reversal, defendants argue these points:
( 1) plaintiff's failure to seek relief from the board of equalization on the alleged improper assessments as preliminary
to judicial review; (2) plaintiff's possession of equitable title
in the property on the respective dates as justifying its liability for the full fee tax assessments; and (3) plaintiff's
adjusted tax liability as a matter referable to the taxing
authorities for determination in new assessment proceedings
rather than subject to computation by the trial court in
effecting an equitable offset. In the light of the record and
applicable legal principles, defendants' objections are not
well taken.
The property involved is known as Parcels 2 and 5 of the
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Hichmond
of about 115 acres
with various buildings, wharves,
and other structures used as part of a government
\V orld
War H. At the end of the war this
the control of the vV ar Assets
as surplus property, and that agency on
, listed it with other
for sale
invited bids.
The im·itation
the bidder to declare the purpose
for 'Yhich he intended to use the
and stated that
title would be conveyed
quitclaim deed without warranty,
express or
It also provided that the successful bidder shall ''assume responsibility for and agree to pay hi,;
prorated from . . . [the date of assumption of possession or the delivery of the formal instruments of eonveyauce], of all general and special real and personal property
taxes which may have been or may be assessed thereon." It
further stipulated that a minimum of 20 per cent of the
purchase price should constitute the down payment; that the
suecessful bidder could not make any sale or lease of the
property for three years after the ''date of conveyance''
without the g·overnment 's consent; and that the invitation
and bid under it should constitute the agreement between
the parties, to be succeeded only by the formal instruments
of transfer.
On August 15, 1947, Parr-Richmond Terminal Corporation,
an affiliate of plaintiff, submitted conditional bids for both
parcels, separately stating the amounts offered for the realty
and the personal property thereon. Inasmuch as the tax issue
here relates wholly to the realty ownership, only the bids
relating thereto need be noted-$820,000 for Parcel 2 and
$12il,OOO for Parcel 5. One condition was that each parcel
should be treated "as a unit as to lands and buildings and
personal property." Another condition (Rider D) specified:
''This bid is also subject to the ability of bidder to procure
a policy of title insurance in its name or in the name of its
nominee . . . as of the date of the completion of this transaction, in the event of acceptance hereof, showing
and
merchantable title to said property free and clear of any
lien or encumbrance whieh would substantially affect its
yalne!' Before bidding Parr had learned from a preliminary
title report that the title was not then merchantable. It was
also stipulated that the three-year restriction on sale or lease
of the property, as stated in the invitation to bid, supra, would
have to be waived or removed (Rider A).
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the ~A'C'A~H~
was communicated to Parr in
that ''under date of
Assets Administration
the sale to the Parr-Hichmond
Industrial
of Parcels Nos. 2 and 5 . . . together
\rith certain
and ~MMnr.v>fl
. . . in accordance with the terms and conditions of your
offer of August 15, 1947, as amended. . . . The quitclaim
deed as prepared will convey title as of 12 :01 a. m. September
1947." This letter gave "consent to the Parr-Richmond
Industrial Corporation andjor the Parr-Richmond Terminal
Company, as the case may be, to enter upon and use the
buildings, improvements, and
property, the
title to which is being conveyed to you as of 12:01 a. m.
September 23, 1947, for its account .
also "the
immediate right to resell or lease,
terms and
conditions as specified in your offer of
1947, any
or all of the
buildings, improvements
personal
located on Parcels 2 and 5 without prior authorization from the \Var Assets Administration.'' The letter
also provided for the eserowing of the down payment: ''Your
eompany, in aecepting this I.~etter of
agrees, prior
to entering into
to deposit with the . . . Title
. . . the agreed upon initial payment of . . .
$122,412.42 . . . " On January 30, 1948, Parr delivered a
check in the stated amount to the title company, accompanied
a letter of instructions
in
as follows:
" . . . whichever corporation does take title, you are authorized to deliver to the \Var Assets Administration the sum
of . . . $122,412.42 . . . upon their depositing with you a
Deed duly executed by said War Assets Admiuwhich will vest merchantable title in favor of either
Parr-Richmond Industrial
or Parr-Richmond
Terminal Company as such determination shall be made. . . .
receipt of this letter and the check enclosed herewith
43 C.2d-6
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will you
acknowledge receipt of same upon the
copy enclosed herewith so that we may in turn hand it to
the \V ar Assets Administration as evidence of the fact that
this money has been deposited with you in the above-numbered
escrows.''
On
31, 1948, Parr acknowledged and accepted the
''letter of intent.'' During that same month Parr had taken
possession of both parcels in accord with the letter's authorization, and on the first Monday in March of both 1948 and
1949 held possession thereunder. It was not until June 1,
1949, that title passed pursuant to two quitclaim deeds executed as of that date, acknowledged and delivered by "the
United States of America, acting by and through War Assets
Administration,'' to plaintiff as grantee-one deed for each
parcel. Each deed concluded with the statement, ''This
Quitclaim Deed, executed this 1st day of June, 1949, shall
be considered effective as of the day and year first hereinabove
written," which was J nne 1, 1949-the date the government
actually conveyed title, not September 23, 1947, as recited
in the "letter of intent." The title company thereupon delivered to the government two deeds of trust dated and
acknowledged on June 1, 1949-one for each parcel-securing
the balance of the purchase price. Thus the down payment
was in escrow from January 30, 1948, to June 1, 194916 months.
As above noted, the government's invitation to bid required
each bidder to specify the purposes for which he intended
to use the property. The Parr bids stated that its purpose
was development of the property as an industrial area, bringing in new industries by long-term leases and by sale. These
declarations, plus Parr's insistence on the removal of the
three-year restrictions against sales and leases, make it clear
that a merchantable title was an indispensable requisite of
Parr's intended purchase. To that point the trial court found
that "plaintiff's bid contemplated the long-term lease or sale
of part or all of said realty to industrial firms desiring to
locate in the city of Richmond, and . . . that purpose could
not be achieved unless and until plaintiff could obtain a
merchantable title to said realty; Rider D of plaintiff's bid
recited the express condition of merchantable title, and went
to the essence of plaintiff's conditional bid and the conditional
agreement subsequently entered into between the U.S.A. and
plaintiff.''
The trial court :found also that under the "letter o:f intent"
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Parr agreed to purchase the property if, as and when the
government could convey a good and merchantable title,
and that the government agreed on its part to convey such
title if, as and when it could do so; further, that during all
of the year 1948 the ''contemplated sale or conveyance was
wholly executory, and at all of said times there were clouds,
encumbrances and adverse claims upon the title to said realty
which adversely affected said title to a substantial degree,
and which rendered said title unmerchantable." The trial
court further found that on the first Monday in March, 1948,
there was uncertainty as to whether the government "would
be able to convey . . . [a] good and merchantable title"
and if so, when, and that on that date Parr's ''only interest,
right or title'' to the property ''was a qualified and contingent
possessory interest in the form of a gratuitous and revocable
right to possession, the reasonable duration of" which was
found to be a "period of one year."
The trial court further found that ''As of the first Monday
of March, 1948, for the tax year 1948-1949, defendant county
. . . assessed all of said realty against plaintiff in the same
manner and with the same effect as though plaintiff were
the owner in fee of said realty with full beneficial ownership
and use thereof. Said realty was . . . assessed . . . [at]
$229,090.00 for real estate, and $335,000.00 for improvements,
together with an assessment of $25,500 for certain personal
property then situated on said realty; said assessment . . .
was . . . charged to plaintiff upon the assessment roll of
the eonnty as an assessment against real estate, improvements,
and personal property, and not as an assessment against
plaintiff's said possessory interest. In said assessment defendant county . . . did not segregate the plaintiff's qualified
and contingent possessory interest in said realty from the
fee ownership of the United States, and did not assess said
possessory interest to plaintiff, but instead erroneously assessed the entire fee ownership of said realty to plaintiff; a
proper segregation of plaintiff's qualified and contingent possessory interest in said realty and a proper assessment of
said interest . . . would have resulted in an assessed value
. . . of $71,581.00 . . . . " The trial court also found and
concluded that the assessments when made by both county
and city were illegal and void for the reason that the United
States was the owner in fee of the property taxed against
Parr, and that Parr's possessory interest had not been assessed
at all.
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of tax asvaluation which should have
before a
§ 1607.) Plaintiff
tax years it filed ''a
for eancellation of erroneous and
with the reeach

rrcoursE~

court.

ne>,r>C>O'Qlt" for
resort to the
claims that
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zation for correction
a condition for
p. 313; Brenner v. Los
As vms said in Assom·ated Oil
5, at page 9
"\Vhile in one sense it is true that almost auy mistake which
r"sults in an excessive assessment amounts
an overvaluation of the
of a
we think there is a real
and distinct difference between those cases in which it may
properly be said that the error is one of overvaluation and
those eases in which the overvaluation is a mere incidental
resnlt of an erroneous assessment of
which should
not have been assessed.'' [3] So here
's
of
relief---from an
tax because it was levied
a
the whole
nterest for which plaintiff admitted
its
applieation to the board of
eourse to the court. (See Un£ted States v.
:322 U.S. 174, 187 [64 S.Ct. 908, 88 hEd. 1209]; Gottstein, v.
202 CaL 581, 584-585
P.
; Los
v.
Board
108 CaLApp.
664-665
P.
5391 0)
There now remains the principal issue of ·whether the chaltax assessments may be supported under the doctrine
of' equitable conversion. Defendants contend that wl1ile the
government may have held legal title to the
plaintiff
held equitable title under an executory contract of
an
interest assessable on the basis of the full value as "real
property" (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 104), rather than a mere
segregable "possessory interest" (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 107).
[ 4] The doctrine of equitable conversion "is a mere fiction
resting upon the principle that equity regards things which
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are directed to be done as
actually been performed
has intervened which ought to prevent such
n
" (l!J Am ..Jm., § 2, p. 2.) [5] An unconditional contract for the sale of land, of which specific performance would be decreed, grants the purchaser equitable
title, and equity considers him the owner. (1 Tiffany on
Heal Property
eel.], § 307, p. 528; 2 Pomeroy's Equity
,Jurisprudence [5th ed.], § 372, p. 33; Estate of Dwyer, 159
CaL 664, 675
P. 235] .) [6] But there is no equitable
conversion where the contracting parties demonstrate an intention to the contrary. (19 Am .•Jur., § 4, p. 4; Estate of
Pfarr, 144 Cal. 121, 128 [77 P. 825] ; Estate of Gracey, 200
CaL 482, 488-489 [253 P. 921] ; McCaughna v. Bilhorn, 10
Cal.App.2d 674, 678-679 [52 P.2d 1025].)
[7] The trial court resolved the question of the vesting
of equitable title by holding that ''at no time prior to or
during said tax year was plaintiff the legal or equitable
owner . . . . " The record clearly supports that conclusion:
(a) Parr knew before it bid that a variety of mattersincluding uncompleted proceedings in eminent domainrendered the title unmerchantable; (b) the government accepted the conditional bid which called for a merchantable
title; (c) the escrow provisions in the "letter of intent"
were tacit admissions by the government that it needed time
to make the title good; and (d) the 16-month delay before
execution of the quitclaim deeds accentuated the time consideration required for the removal of all clouds and encumbrances on the title. Defendants argue that the government's letter of September 23, 1947, which was accepted
by Parr in conclusion of the parties' negotiations as to the
price to he paid for the property, constituted their contract.
That letter made no reference to Parr's offer and its conditions as to merchantable title. However, it was followed by
the goverJJment 's formal acceptance in the "letter of intent,"
and the trial court properly concluded that this latter document, later in point of time-January 21, 1948-and incorporating the government's invitation for bids along with
the terms of Parr's conditional bids, constituted the conditional agreement between the parties. The "letter of intent"
contained the escrow provisions above quoted, which thereby
became part of the parties' contract. Any doubt as to the
parties' intentions was settled by the recital in both quitclaim
deeds that they became effective as of their date, which was
June 1, 1949. As so executed, the deeds themselves super-
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seded and nullified the provisions in the earlier writing to
the effect that title would be conveyed ''as of 12 :01 a. m.
September 23, 1947," and made it clear that title vested on
June 1, 1949, and not before.
Defendants rely on S.R.A., Inc. v. State of Minnesota, 327
U.S. 558 [66 S.Ct. 749, 90 L.Ed. 851], but the facts found
by the trial court and above discussed clearly distinguish the
present situation. The two eases have one point in common,
in that the property in both instances was surplus real estate,
the legal title to which was vested in the United States.
However, there are several points of difference which are
material: (1) In the S.R.A. case the contract was the
normal vendor-vendee contract, where the government retained legal title only as security for the balance of the
purchase price and ''in substance [was] in the position of
a mortgagee." (P. 565.) Here the vendor-vendee contract,
as modified in writing by the escrow instructions, provided
for the transfer of title only if and when the government
could convey a merchantable title, pending which uncertain
event the down payment itself was held in escrow. The government was retaining title not for security but during the
time allowed for its agreed performance, and then appropriate
deeds were to be executed, and notes, secured by deeds of
trust, were to be and were given for the balance of the
purchase price. (2) Here the whole transaction centered
on acquisition of a merchantable title, a matter not at all
involved in the S.R.A. case, where "[a]ll obligations due
under the contract had been met." (P. 560.) (3) In the
S.R.A. case the buyer was "in possession . . . under a contract of sale with uncompleted conditions for execution and
delivery of the muniments of title'' when the purchase price
was paid in full (p. 561), while here the buyer occupied the
property under what the trial court found to be "a gratuitous
and revocable right to possession'' granted by the ''letter
of intent," an arrangement covering the interval for clearing
a good and merchantable title, at which time the muniments
of title were to be delivered out of escrow and deeds of trust
given back. ( 4) During that interval Parr did not occupy
the status of a normal vendee as in the S.R.A. case, where
the vendee had made the down payment and nothing remained
to be done by the parties except payment of the balance of
the purchase price and execution of the formal conveyance.
Here the fact that Parr was not in the position of the conventional vendee during the 16-month escrow period but

time the rights
on
§ ]02,
. supra, 159 Cal. 664, 675.)
not have at that time the title
which he contracted to convey, iJJere is no conversion.''
on
§ 106, pp. 182-188; see also Amund1'< :son,
41 S.D. Wi7
170 ?\.\V.
63"11.)
[10] Here the contract bound Parr to
the property
if the
within a reasonable time eon
a merAt the time of the contract's execution the
did not have such a title. It was bound, however,
in clearing the title. But
to exereise reasonable
not then
that which it contracted to convey, the govermnent had no right to specific performance at that time.
Therefore there
eonversion to support the
tax assessments
and its protest thereof must
be sustained.
[11]
eontend that the trial eourt erred
in itself
's tax liability rather than re1he matter to the tax authorities for appropriate
Plaintiff has conceded throughout
that its possessory interest vYas taxable (Iiev.
§ 107), and therefore that it wonld be "in.
equitable" for it "to seek to recover taxes which in eqnity
it should pay." In such cases the rule applies that recovery
should be limited to the difference between the tax paid and
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that which properly should have been paid (DeFremery v.
Austin, 53 CaL 380, 382-383), and that rule was followed
here.
In determining the tax on plaintiff's possessory interest
the trial court followed the formula similarly used in Kaiser
v. Reid, 30 Cal.2d 610, which was a valuation method theretofore judicially approved in cases presenting analogous considerations affecting possessory rights. (Blinn Lbr. Co. v.
Cmmty of Los Angeles, 216 Cal. 474, 478-479 [14 P.2d 512,
84 A.L.R. 1304] ; Hammond Lbr. Co. v. County of Los Angeles,
supra, 104 Cal.App. 235, 244-245.) The tax as so computed
was then deducted from the amount of tax claimed by defendants, and the judgments herein were entered for the
difference. [12] In the trial court defendants made no
objection to the mathematical accuracy of the computation
of the formula's application if Parr had only a possessory
interest in the property, but they adhered to the correctness
of the challenged tax assessments based on plaintiff's equitable
title to the property for the respective tax years. The trial
court had authority here to so proceed in effecting an equitable
adjustment on the tax assessments and to enter judgments
accordingly. (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 5141.) Under these circumstances, defendants are in no position now to challenge
the correctness of the trial court's finding of what was actually
due from plaintiff based on the approved valuation formula
for possessory interests.
The judgments are affirmed.
Shenk, Acting C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, ,J., Schauer, J.,
and Peek, J. protem.,* concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
It appears that the plaintiff taxpayer should have first
pursued his remedy before the board of supervisors sitting
as a local board of equalization before court action and in
such action the court is limited to a review of the evidence
before the board.
The factual situation should first be clarified. The majority
opinion indicates that this is a case where taxes were assessed
against property plaintiff did not own. That is not the case.
Taxes on real property are not assessed against a person.
They are assessed against the property. Property may be
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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an unknown owner.
& Tax.
§ 611.)
in the name of the owner of real estate does not
render inYal id an assessment or any tax sale." (Rev. &
Tax.
§ 613.) In the case at bar while the entire interest
was assessed to plaintiff as owner it was
assessed
the property and it is conceded that plaintiff
a possessory
has an interest in the property albeit it is
interest. The only question
therefore, whether too great
a value was placed on that interest. It is not a case of
a tax on exempt property or property in which
plaintiff had no interest. He owned a possessory interest
and that was assessed and is taxable. In Fall v. Mayor of
19 Cal. 391, the tax was against a bridge, a reversionary interest in which was owned by the city, but which
the taxpayer had the right to use. The court said (at p.
393) : "There is no doubt, therefore, that the plaintiff has
a taxable estate in the property, and so far as his right to
maintain this suit is concerned, it is immaterial that the
pl'Operty has been assessed at its full value. The objection
on that ground does not go to the validity of the tax, but to
its ammmt, and an application for its reduction was the only
The property was not taxable beyond his interest
in it, and in legal effect, the tax upon it amounted to nothing
more than a tax upon his interest." (Emphasis added.)
In S. & G. Gump Co. v. San Francisco, 18 Cal.2d 129 [114
P.2d 346, 135 A.L.R. 595], it was held that where property
was assessed to a bailee as owner when he merely had a
possessory right, he could not recover taxes paid under protest
where he had not applied to the local board of equalization
for a modification of the assessment and show who was the
owner of the property. The court cited for its holding,
Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Los Angeles, 3 Cal.App. 619
[86 P. 844], where property was assessed to an agent who
held possession for the owner and the court said (p. 621):
"Nor are we prepared to hold that, under the circumstances,
the failure of the assessor to designate the plaintiff's principals or beneficiaries was sufficient to invalidate the assessment. It had the opportunity of correcting the defect, if
in any way harmful to it, by application to the assessor while
the assessment-roll was still under his control, or afterward
by application to the board of equalization, which had power
to correct the plaintiff's assessment, either by adding the
names of the parties ultimately liable, or by transferring
the whole amount taxed to the assessments of the several
iLuO>cac"'c
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. But resort to
rendered unnecessary
case, the error is one in
. and the tax is assailed as
violation of constitutional man-

being
dates ..
"Plaintiff contends, however, that its bank vault doors and
eonnterlines were 'exempt' from taxation under eonstitutional
and that eonsequently prior
to the
board of equalization was not a prerequisite to the maintenance of this action. The contention cannot be sustained.
'rhe vault doors and counterlines admittedly were located
within the county, city and district in which
were assessed. Clearly, they were property of a nature taxable by
r1efendan ts . . . . The fact that similar
of others
had been
misclassified as
and therefore relieved of the burden of special assessment district
ta:xeoo: would
that
also be excused
however,
from paying such taxel; . . . . It does not
that
vault doors and counterlincs were tax
as claimed. A somewhat similar problem was
in
Los
etc.
v. Los Angeles
22 Oa1.App.2d
418 [71 P.2d
'rhat case involved the assessment of a
leasehold interest in tidelands owned by the
Plaintiff
crmfendcd that since the leasehold had no taxable
the
tax was one on noncx1:stent
and resort to the board
of
was not necessary. In
that contention, the court there said, at pp. 423-424: 'But it does not
follow that if the property belongs to a class which is subject
to taxation it is nonexistent
because under the pecu1iar circumstances existing it is without taxable value . . . .' "
(Emphasis added.) The same rule is stated in Banh of
A meriea v.
37 Oal.2d 1 [229 P.2d
Similarly
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in the instant case the property was taxable. At least plaintiff's conceded possessory interest was taxable, and the question is not whether it was
property or outside the
taxing jurisdiction.
There is no tenable distinction between this case and the
rules set forth in the
Bank case. The cases relied
upon by the majority do not support the statement that
resort need not be had to the local board of equalization
where the person who is named as owner of the property
assessed is not the owner. In Brenner v. Los Angeles, 160
Cal. 72 [116 P. 397], the claim was that all of the property
against which the assessment was made was exempt from
taxation. In Associated Oil Co. v. County of Orange, 4 Cal.
App.2d 5 [40 P.2d 887], the assessment was on nonexistent
property and the holding is doubtful in view of the Security
Bank case. In Gottstein v. Adams, 202 Cal. 581 [262 P. 314],
and Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors, 108 Cal.App. 655
[292 P. 539), there was no question of exhausting the administrative remedy.
In any event it would appear that the matter should have
been remanded to the local board of equalization to ascertain
the value of the possessory interest and reduce the assessment
aceordingly, beeause it is that board, rather than a court.
which has jurisdiction over valuation questions. (Universal
Consol. Oil Co. v. Byram, 25 Cal.2d 353 [153 P.2d 746];
La Grange etc. Co. v. Carter, 142 Cal. 560 [76 P. 2411 ; Los
Angeles etc. Co. v. Connty of Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 164 [121
P. 384, 9 A.L.R. 1277].)
I would therefore reverse the ,judgment.

